Net migration to the UK - Migration Observatory (2023)

The UK has experienced broadly similar levels of migration compared to other high-income countries, on average over the past few decades

Migration levels fluctuate from year to year, but over long periods, a useful measure of how much immigration a country has experienced is the size of the foreign-born population as a percentage of the population. Countries with high levels of net migration—defined as people immigrating minus those emigrating—develop larger foreign-born or migrant populations over the long run.

By the beginning of the 2020s, the UK’s foreign-born population was approximately 14%. This share is similar to high-income countries such as the United States and Spain (Figure 1). The UK has a smaller foreign-born population than Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. The foreign-born population in Australia, for example, is roughly double that of the UK as a share of the population. By contrast, the UK has a higher share of foreign-born people in the population compared to Italy, Portugal, and most Eastern European countries.

Figure 1

The scale of migration to a country may have some economic impact, but research suggests that the composition of migration is more important than the numbers alone. Whether migrants are working and what skills and qualifications they bring are among the key factors that affect the effects of migration on the economy (MAC, 2018). For more discussion of the economic impacts of migration, see the Migration Observatory briefings, The Fiscal Impacts of Immigration in the UK, and The Labour Market Effects of Immigration.

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Net migration was unusually high in 2022, as several factors came together at the same time, including the war in Ukraine

Net migration is a commonly used measure of the overall scale of migration in the UK. It takes into account not just people moving to the country, but also those leaving. This helps understand migration’s contribution to population growth—especially since many people who move to the UK do not remain here permanently. However, the net migration measure has many flaws. For example, it tells us little about who is arriving and leaving or what their impacts are. It can also produce counterintuitive or misleading figures when migration patterns change substantially in a short period, as discussed further below. The UK is unusual in its choice to use net migration in policy debates as the main measure for discussing migration levels.

Official net migration estimates are currently very uncertain and published figures will be revised. For example, in 2022 ONS revised the estimate of net migration for the year ending June 2021 down by 28% or 66,000. (For more detail, see the Evidence Gaps and Limitations section, below.)

With this caveat in mind, estimates from the Office of National Statistics suggest that total net migration was 504,000 in the year ending June 2022. This was substantially above pre-pandemic estimates of between 300,000 and 400,000 (depending on which measure is used) (Figure 1).

Figure 2

The increase in overall net migration was driven by non-EU migration. Non-EU migration to the UK increased during the 2010s but rose particularly sharply after the pandemic. Meanwhile, EU net migration fell from 2016 onwards and remained low in the early 2020s (Figure 3).

Figure 3

Visa data give a more detailed picture of the reasons for non-EU migration patterns. Visa data overstate long-term immigration because not all people who receive visas actually move to the UK, and many come for just a few weeks or months and are not long-term migrants. Nonetheless, they provide an accurate indication of overall trends over time and show that three main factors drove recent increases in non-EU migration (Figure 4):

• “Bespoke humanitarian routes”. The largest single factor explaining the increase in visas granted to non-EU citizens from 2019 to the year ending June 2022 was the introduction of visa routes for Ukrainians and Hong Kong British Nationals (Overseas) status holders. Together these two routes contributed 45% of the 467,000 increase during this period (excluding visitors and short-term study). These routes are part of the ‘other’ category in Figure 6.
• International students accounted for a further 39% of the increase. The UK has an explicit strategy of increasing and diversifying foreign student recruitment, and it is also plausible that the reintroduction of post-study work rights post-Brexit has made the UK more attractive to international students.
• Skilled workers: 23% of the increase in visa grants from 2019 to the year ending June 2022 resulted from work visas—particularly skilled workers. Health and care was the main industry driving the growth. The increase in skilled workers is not solely the result of the post-Brexit immigration system, but also higher demand for workers who were already eligible for visas under the old system, such as doctors and nurses.

The Migration Observatory briefing note, Why has non-EU migration to the UK risen?, explains these figures in more detail.

Figure 4

Net migration at the levels seen in 2022 cannot be assumed to be a ‘new normal’. The future outlook for visa grants is necessarily uncertain. On the one hand, some of the recent contributors to non-EU immigration are not expected to continue indefinitely, such as the arrival of Ukrainians fleeing the war. Emigration is also expected to increase in coming years, because most work and student migrants do not remain in the UK permanently, as explained in the next section. On the other hand, if higher non-EU work and study related migration continue in the long term, it no longer seems likely that the post-Brexit immigration system will mean lower net migration than the UK experienced pre-pandemic.

More detail on the drivers of work and student migration is available in the Migration Observatory briefings, Work visas and migrant workers in the UK and Student migration to the UK.

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Increases in temporary work and study migration post-pandemic contributed to net migration in the short run

Many non-EU citizens come to the UK for periods of a few years, before emigrating again. This means that while they contribute to immigration in the short run, they contribute much less to net migration or to population growth over the long term.

However, in the short to medium term, an uptick in people arriving does affect net migration estimates. This is because an increase in immigration should in theory be followed by an increase in emigration. But the expected emigration typically takes 2-3 years to materialise. This means that recent increases in work and study migration are expected to lead to temporarily higher estimates ofnetmigration for at least 2-3 years, before emigration catches up.

Among students receiving their initial visas in 2014, for example, just over half had seen their visas expire by the end of 2016 and thus were expected to have left the country. At that time, there was no Graduate work route, so current student cohorts may stay longer on average—but post-study work does not provide a direct route to settlement. Among non-EU citizens with visas granted in 2008, when the previous post-study work regime was in place, 83% nonetheless saw their visas expire by the end of the seventhyear after arrival (Figure 5).

Even if a majority of students and workers eventually leave the country, those who remain do of course contribute to net migration in the long term and not just the short term. For example, if 500,000 sponsored students arrived in a given year and 17% remained permanently, that annual cohort would contribute 85,000 to net migration over the long term.

Figure 5

Students’ temporary stays have previously generated debate about whether they should be included in net migration statistics. Net migration data are used to generate population estimates, and since students are part of the population, removing them from the UK’s main net migration figures would make population estimates less accurate. Other countries routinely include students in their net migration statistics, including Australia, Canada, the United States and New Zealand. One difference between the UK and other countries is that UK policy debates focus more on net migration (and thus are more affected by idiosyncrasies of the net migration measure), while debate in other countries tends to focus on immigration and grants of temporary or permanent status.

To date, it has not been technically feasible for ONS to produce a measure of net migration excluding students, in any case. This is because the data sources did not accurately capture international students as they emigrate. Current developments in official migration statistics may make it possible to produce an estimate excluding international students, in addition to (not instead of) the standard net migration estimates that include students.

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EU citizens made no contribution to net migration by the year ending June 2022

Shortly before the 2016 referendum on EU membership, EU citizens made up the majority of all net migration to the UK (excluding British citizens). Depending on the data source used, EU citizens contributed between 59% and 77% of estimated net migration in the year ending March 2015 (Figure 6). This high share was unusual by historical standards, and partly resulted from temporary factors: Romanian and Bulgarian citizens receiving full access to the UK labour market in 2014, and migration from Southern European countries where youth unemployment was high due to the Eurozone crisis.

Since the 2016 referendum, the picture has changed. Although policy towards EU citizens did not change until January 2021, EU net migration began to fall immediately after the referendum. Possible explanations for this decline include the economic recovery in southern European countries following the Eurozone crisis; the decline in the value of the pound after the referendum, which made work in the UK less attractive; and uncertainty about the political climate. The decline in the EU share also resulted from rising non-EU migration during the same period.

During the pandemic, provisional ONS experimental estimates suggest that EU net migration fell sharply. EU net migration was estimated at -94,000 EU in 2020 (i.e. there was 94,000 net emigration). If free movement rules had remained in place, migration of EU citizens might have been expected to bounce back, especially in light of labour shortages. However, the post-Brexit immigration system greatly reduced opportunities for EU citizens to move to the UK. Take-up of work visas among EU citizens in the post-Brexit immigration system in 2021 was relatively low, as explained in the Migration Observatory briefing, Work visas and migrant workers in the UK.

By the year ending June 2022, ONS estimates suggested that net migration of EU citizens remained negative, at -51,000. The impacts of lower EU net migration in the labour market are discussed in the Migration Observatory report, How is the End of Free Movement Affecting the Low-Wage Labour Force in the UK?

Figure 6

The decline in EU immigration and net migration from 2016 to 2020 was driven primarily by countries that joined the EU in 2004 (“EU-8” countries, i.e. Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Hungary, Estonia, Slovenia, Slovakia and Czechia) (Figure 7). The most recent, post-pandemic net migration estimates do not include a breakdown for different EU citizen groups. However, 81% of EU citizens receiving visas to come to the UK under the post-Brexit immigration system in the year ending September 2022 were from EU-14 countries such as France, Spain or Germany (figures exclude temporary visitor, transit, short-term study and frontier workers). This is consistent with projections that the post-Brexit immigration system would have the largest impact on Eastern European migration.

Figure 7

Note that some EU citizens immigrating to the UK in 2021 and 2022 will not require a visa because they have previously lived in the UK and hold status under the EU Settlement Scheme (EUSS). The number of people in this situation is not known, as they cannot be identified in the data ONS uses to estimate EU migration patterns.

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Projections of future net migration are inherently uncertain

The estimate of 504,000 net migration in the year ending June 2022 contrasts with lower projections of future net migration from ONS and the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR).

ONS produces population projections that are used for planning services and making public finance forecasts, among other things. This requires assumptions about future net migration. Making these assumptions is difficult because migration patterns depend on so many different factors both within and beyond government policy. ONS assumptions typically have not taken into account migration policy announcements or political intentions, but instead are based on historical migration and consultations with academic experts.

In its most recent population projections, produced in early 2022 and based on 2020 data, ONS assumed that net migration would fall to an average long-term level of 205,000 by 2027. The fact that net migration in the year ending June 2022 was an estimated 504,000 does not mean that this projection is ‘wrong,’ since the projection is for long-term migration after 2027 when some of the factors that have increased net migration recently may no longer be present.

Nonetheless, net migration assumptions contained in population projections over the past twenty years have usually undershot. Figure 5 shows the ONS migration assumption used in its principal population projection compared to official estimates of net migration in the same year. In most years, actual net migration has been higher than the projection based on data for the same year, which means that the projections assumed net migration would decline in future. In practice, net migration has fluctuated up and down, but usually remained higher than projected. For example, net migration was an estimated 229,000 in 2008. The 2008-based population projections assumed that net migration would fall to 180,000 within a few years. However, it remained persistently above 180,000, with a brief exception in 2012. Another exceptional year was 2020, when the Covid-19 pandemic unexpectedly reduced net migration.

Figure 8

Evidence Gaps and Limitations

Official migration statistics are in a period of change. ONS identified several limitations in its pre-pandemic data sources, and over the past few years has been developing new approaches to address them. In the meantime, the Covid-19 pandemic reduced the quality of migration data.

As a result, recent migration estimates are provisional and highly uncertain. They could be revised substantially. For example, the November 2022 publication that produced migration estimates for the year ending June 2022 also provided revised estimates for previous years following methodological developments. These revisions were large: net migration for the year ending June 2020 was revised down by 172,000 or 66%, and the estimate for the year ending June 2021 was revised down by 66,000 or 28%.

There are several sources of uncertainty in the current methodology used to produce migration estimates. For example, ONS must make assumptions about the share of people granted long-term visas who will not remain in the UK for the full duration of their visa. The migration of British Nationals Overseas (BNO) status holders has also created statistical difficulties because some of them appear to have been counted as British Nationals in the International Passenger Survey, which is used to estimate net migration of UK citizens. People crossing the channel in small boats will typically not be included in the ONS estimates.

Estimates of EU citizen migration come from the RAPID tax and benefits database, which is not designed to measure migration flows. In the most recent estimates, both immigration and emigration of EU citizens are relatively high at 224,000 and 275,000, respectively. The EU immigration estimate is much higher than the number of visas granted to EU citizens (52,000 in the year ending June 2022, excluding visitors, transit and frontier workers who do not live in the UK). One reason for the gap may be EU citizens who already hold pre-settled status under the EU Settlement Scheme (and who cannot be separately identified in current data sources). However, it is also possible that the estimates are counting people who enter and leave the RAPID dataset as immigrants and emigrants, respectively, even if they do not leave the UK.

Acknowledgments

Thanks to Chris Stickney for comments on an earlier draft of this briefing. This research as supported by Trust for London. Trust for London is one of the largest independent charitable foundations in London and supports work which tackles poverty and inequality in the capital. More details atwww.trustforlondon.org.uk.

References

• Migration Advisory Committee. 2018. EEA Migration in the UK: Final Report. London: MAC.
• ONS. 2019. Understanding different migration data sources: June progress report. Newport: ONS.
• ONS. 2022. Long-term international migration, provisional: year ending June 2022. Newport: ONS.